Non-responsibility and narrow scope reading of positive polarity indefinites in negative imperatives and negated controlled infinitive complements

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Abstract This study examines an apparently peculiar narrow scope reading of positive polarity indefinites in negative imperatives, as in *Do not question somebody's immigration status*, and in negated controlled infinitive complements, as in *I was trying not to be somebody's bitch*, and proposes, referring to Richardson (1985) and Szabolcsi (2010), that (I) non-responsibility induced by the predicate leads us (i) to project a subjunctive complement, (ii) to allow the negation to be interpreted in a clause-external position, and (iii) to coerce a monitoring predicate, *take care*, all of which amount to paraphrasing the above two examples by *Take care for it not to be the case that you question somebody's immigration status* and *I was trying to take care for it not to be the case that I be somebody's bitch*; (II) this analysis in terms of coercion is more compatible with a property-denoting approach to imperatives and controlled complements, than with a proposition-denoting approach.

Keywords non-responsibility · positive polarity item · negation · imperative · obligatory control · obviation

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1 Introduction

This study aims first at examining an apparently peculiar narrow scope reading of indefinite pronouns, observed in some negative imperatives and negated controlled infinitive complements, and second at shedding new light on the discussion about imperatives and controlled infinitives, two constructions which "semantically show significant parallels" (Potsdam 1998: 216), and which have yielded parallel approaches in terms of denoting properties vs. propositions. The discussion is based mainly on data from English, but also from other languages, especially Japanese.

   The indefinite pronoun *somebody* in (1a-b) is out-scoped by a clause-mate negation.[1,2] Indefinites with *some* are known as Positive Polarity Items (PPIs) which should take wide scope over a clause-mate negation. The narrow scope reading observed in (1a-b) is at first glance surprising.

(1) a. [How to avoid offending minority customers?] Do not touch them. [. . .] Do not use profanity or racial slurs, and do <u>not</u> question **somebody**'s immigration status. (COCA)
     b. Basically, I was trying <u>not</u> to be **somebody**'s bitch for 10 years. (COCA)

In order to account for this reading, I invoke (i) Richardson (1985) who claims that some negative imperatives, like in (2a), convey not a prohibition but a command of monitoring activity, and proposes to paraphrase its meaning by the coerced monitoring predicate TAKE CARE, as in (2b), and (ii) Szabolcsi (2010) who argues that a controlled infinitive complement denoting a situation where the *responsibility* relation (defined below) doesn't hold, as in (3a), is semantically equivalent to a subjunctive complement and that the negation may be interpreted in a lowered but clause-external position, as in (3b).

(2) a. Don't fall off the ladder! (Richardson 1985: 247)
     b. TAKE CARE not to fall off the ladder. (*ibid.*)

(3) a. I do<u>n't</u> want to offend **someone**. (Szabolcsi 2004: 417, fn. 10)
     b. I want for it <u>not</u> to be the case [that I offend **someone**]. (Szabolcsi 2010: 6)

Partly modifying their ideas, this study proposes that (I) in examples like

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[1] The same is true for the Japanese indefinite pronoun *nanika* 'something' in (i).

(i)   **nanika-o**   *okiwasure-<u>nai</u> yooni-si-naitoikenai.*
      something-ACC misplace-NEG so.as.to-do-should
      'I should take care <u>not</u> to misplace **something**.'
      (https://tinyurl.com/y85csgor)

[2] Glosses follow the Leipzig Glossing Rules. Abbreviations not included in their list are: CONJ = conjunctive verbal form; DISJ = disjunctive verbal form; RESP = responsibility; PPI = positive polarity item; TDL = to-do-list; SenP = Sentential Phrase.

(1a-b), the nature of the predicate leads (i) to coerce the predicate TAKE CARE, (ii) to project a subjunctive complement, and (iii) to allow negation to be interpreted in a clause-external position, all of which amount to paraphrasing (1a-b) by (4a-b); (II) this analysis in terms of a coerced predicate is more compatible with a property-denoting approach to imperatives and controlled complements, than with a proposition-denoting one.

(4)   a.   TAKE CARE for it <u>not</u> to be the case [that you question **somebody**'s immigration status].
       b.   I was trying to TAKE CARE for it <u>not</u> to be the case [that I be **somebody**'s bitch].

The outline of this study is as follows. §2 reviews Richardson's and Szabolcsi's analyses in view of the notion of responsibility. §3 presents my main proposals. Next, after having quickly reviewed two approaches to imperatives and to infinitive complements, §4 compares their compatibility with the analysis proposed here. §5 recapitulates my main claims.

2 Previous analyses

In this section, I first present the notion of responsibility introduced by Farkas (1988), which allows us to capture the semantic parallelism between imperatives and obligatory control (§2.1). I next review, from the perspective of responsibility, Richardson's (1985) analysis of negative imperatives (§2.2). Then, I discuss Szabolcsi (2010) and Zu (2018) who suggest that infinitive complements are structurally ambiguous depending on the nature of the predicate (§2.3 and §2.4).

2.1 The responsibility relation

Farkas (1988: 36) advocates, to account for the semantics of controlled infinitives, as in (5a), a responsibility relation, defined as a "two-place relation, RESP(i,s), holding between an individual i and a situation s just in case i brings s about, that is, just in case s is the result of some act performed by i with the intention of bringing s about". She then notes that the RESP relation is equally relevant to appropriate uses of the rational clause *in order to*, as in (5b), the adverb *intentionally*, as in (5c), and imperatives, as in (5d).

(5)   a.   Mary ordered John to leave. (Farkas 1988: 31)
        b.   John read Anna Karenina in order to impress Mary. (*idem*.36)
        c.   John fell off the ladder intentionally. (*idem*.39)
        d.   [To John] Be polite! (*ibid.*)

(5a-d) are acceptable since a RESP relation holds between John and his leaving, his reading 'Anna Karenina', his falling off the ladder or his being polite, while (6a-d) are strange since it is difficult in ordinary situations to assume a RESP relation between John and his resemblance to his father.

(6)   a.   #Pete ordered John to resemble his father. (*idem*.46)
        b.   #John resembles his father in order to annoy his grandmother.
              (*idem*.36)
        c.   #John resembles his father intentionally. (*idem*.39)
        d.   #[To John] Resemble your father. (*ibid.*)

2.2 Negative imperatives as a command of a monitoring activity

The RESP relation equally holds in negative imperatives expressing a prohibition, as in (7a). This example is in effect incompatible with the non-RESP-inducing adverb *inadvertently*, as in (7b).

(7)   a.   Don't trip!
        b.   #Don't inadvertently trip!

This is not the case with the negative imperatives in (8a-b): A RESP relation does not hold between the addressee and her not falling off the ladder or her not catching cold, as confirmed by the compatibility with *inadvertently*.

(8)   a.   [To a carpenter] Don't (inadvertently) fall off the ladder!
              (Adapted from (2a))
        b.   Don't (inadvertently) catch cold!
              (Adapted from Richardson: 1985)

    According to Richardson (1985: 246), in (8a), "not falling off the ladder is for the carpenter not an act [. . .], but rather a state of affairs which he must try to maintain if he is going to accomplish whatever his positive intentions might be". The same is true for not catching cold in (8b).

In other words, negative imperatives like (8a-b) do not convey prohibitions but "commands to monitor against the events denoted by the VPs" (*idem.*247). Richardson proposes to capture this meaning by means of coercion of the monitoring predicate TAKE CARE, as in (9a-b).

(9)   a.   TAKE CARE not to fall off the ladder. (*ibid.*)
        b.   TAKE CARE not to catch cold. (*ibid.*)

Now, the negative imperative in (1a) equally conveys, in the relevant context where the speaker gives some advises to avoid offending minority customers, a command of a monitoring activity, which is confirmed by the acceptability of *inadvertently*, as in (10a), and by a possibility of the paraphrase in (10b).

(10)   a.   Do not inadvertently question somebody's immigration status. (Adapted from (1a))
        b.   TAKE CARE not to question somebody's immigration status.

But the motivation of coercion remains unclear, and the paraphrase in (10b) does not yet account for the narrow scope reading of *somebody* under negation. To tackle the second question, I review Szabolcsi's (2010) analysis in the next section.

2.3 The ambiguity of controlled infinitives, and obviation exemptions

Szabolcsi's (2010) analysis is based on Farkas's (1992) discussion on obviation. Obviation is a constraint requiring the subject of a subjunctive clause to be disjoint in reference from the matrix subject. Farkas (1992: 104) claims that there is a "canonical control case", where "both the complement [subject] and the matrix argument it is referentially dependent on bear the RESP relation to [the complement situation]" and that "obviation is strongest in case the semantic characteristics of canonical control are met". Thus, in Hungarian, when the complement of volition verbs denotes an intentional act, like *go to the movie* in (11a-b), the semantic characteristics of canonical control are met and obviation is imposed: when matrix and complement subjects are coreferential, the infinitive in (11a) is chosen, while the subject of a subjunctive clause cannot be coreferential with the matrix subject, as in (11b).

(11) a. *János moziba   akar   men-ni.* (Hungarian)
          J.   movie-into want.3SG go.INF
          'János wants to go to the movie.' (Farkas 1992: 92)

      b. *János₁ azt   akarja, hogy pro*₁/₂ moziba   men-jen.*
          J.   it.ACC want.3SG that   (he/she) movie-into go-SBJV
          'János wants that he/she go to the movie.' (*ibid.*)

However, when the context forces the complement to receive a non-RESP
reading, obviation may fail to obtain and a controlled subjunctive comple-
ment, as in (12a), is as acceptable as a controlled infinitive complement,
as in (13a).[3]

(12) *Controlled subjunctive complement*
      a. *Nem akarom, hogy lelőjek   valakit.* (Hungarian)
          not   want.1SG that shoot.SBJV.1SG someone.ACC
          'I don't want that I shoot someone.' (Szabolcsi 2010: 7)

      b. [RESP reading] #You can trust me with a gun, because I want
          to shoot no one. (Paraphrase given by Zu (2018: 152))

      c. [non-RESP reading] Take this gun from me because I want to
          shoot no one. (*ibid.*)

(13) *Controlled infinitive complement*
      a. *Nem akarok   lelőni   valakit.* (Hungarian)
          not   want.1SG shoot.INF someone.ACC
          'I don't want to shoot someone.' (Szabolcsi 2010: 7)

      b. [RESP reading] #You can trust me with a gun, because I want

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[3]Ruwet (1990) observes that, equally in French, where obviation is usually observed,
as in (ia), when the complement verb is passivized and the matrix subject does not bear
a RESP relation with the complement situation, as in (ib), this constraint is relaxed and
the subjunctive becomes more acceptable, although it remains less acceptable than the
infinitive in (ic).

(i)   a. *Je veux que je parte. (French)
              'I want for me to leave.' (Ruwet 1990: 18)
      b. ?Je veux que je sois enterré dans mon village natal. (French)
              'I want for me to be buried in the village of my birth.' (*idem.*20)
      c. Je veux être enterré dans mon village natal. (French)
              'I want to be buried in the village of my birth.' (*ibid.*)

    to shoot no one. (Paraphrase given by Zu (2018: 152))
    c.   [non-RESP reading] Take this gun from me because I want to
          shoot no one. (*ibid.*)

Szabolcsi (2010) further observes that, both in subjunctive and infinitive complements, indefinite PPIs may be interpreted differently with respect to the matrix negation depending on the complement meaning: the narrow scope reading of *valakit* 'someone' is impossible when the complement situation receives a RESP reading, as in (12b) and (13b), but possible when it obtains a non-RESP reading, as in (12c) and (13c). Based on this parallel interpretation, Szabolcsi claims that (i) the infinitive complement is structurally different in canonical and non-canonical control; (ii) in the latter, the controlled infinitive, as in (13a), is structurally parallel to the controlled subjunctive, as in (12a).

    She next shows that such a contrast between RESP and non-RESP readings is equally observed in English controlled infinitives. Thus, in (14a) with the RESP-inducing verb *call*, *someone* usually out-scopes the matrix negation, while in (14b) including the non-RESP-inducing verb *offend*, *someone* may take a narrow scope reading.

(14)   a.   *Controlled infinitive with RESP predicate*
              I do<u>n't</u> want to call **someone**. [*not > some]
              (Szabolcsi 2004: 417, fn. 10)
        b.   *Controlled infinitive with non-RESP predicate*
              I do<u>n't</u> want to offend **someone**. [✓not > some] (= (3a))
        c.   I want for it <u>not</u> to be the case [that I offend **someone**]. (= (3b))

This author then claims that (i) just like in Hungarian, English infinitive complements are structurally different in canonical and non-canonical control; (ii) in the latter, as in (14b), the controlled infinitive is structurally parallel to the controlled subjunctive, as in (14c). Furthermore, in order to account for the narrow scope reading of *someone* in (14b), Szabolcsi (2010: 6-7) proposes the following hypotheses: (i) (14b) "doesn't mean *I have no desire to offend someone*, it means, or it definitely can mean *I want not to offend*", that is, the matrix negation is lowered; (ii) the non-RESP relation in (14b) leads to project an implicit extra layer that she calls "non-RESP marker", and that she represents by *for it to be the case that* in (14c); (iii)

the narrow scope reading of *someone* in (14b) is due to the fact that the non-RESP marker "shields from negation"; (iv) "the presence of non-RESP marker is decided locally, by looking at the complement, and not by looking at the relation between a participant of the matrix situation and the complement".

However, the details of her hypotheses raise some problems: (i) the first hypothesis presupposes, without discussion, that the volition verb *want* allows implicit lowering of the matrix negation. But the conditions of Neg-lowering should be examined in a more detailed way (see the discussion in §3.1); (ii) the idea of a non-RESP marker heading a syntactic projection, advocated in the second hypothesis, is not clear. Especially, while the RESP relation between an individual, *i*, and a situation, *s*, is expressed by means of a predicate, as in "*i* intentionally brings about *s*", this is not the case for the non-RESP relation; (iii) the third hypothesis, phrased in terms of "shielding", faces empirical problems;[4] (iv) the fourth hypothesis is based on Szabolcsi's observation that in Hungarian, the scope of indefinite PPIs in non-controlled subjunctive complements depends on the (non) RESP nature of the complement, as in (15b-c), just in the same way as in controlled infinitive complements, illustrated by (16b-c). Especially Szabolcsi argues that indefinite PPIs in non-controlled subjunctive complements conveying a RESP situation cannot be out-scoped by the matrix negation, as in (15b).

(15)   *Non-controlled subjunctive complement*

         a.   *Nem akarom, hogy leugorjál   valahonnan.* (Hungarian)
               not   want.1SG that jump.SBJV.2SG from.somewhere
               'I don't want that you jump from somewhere (I don't want for you to jump from somewhere).' (Szabolcsi 2010: 7)

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[4]Goncharov (2018) observes that on the one hand, in ordinary shielding cases, as in (i), where *always* serves as an intervener, PPI *some* is accepted, while NPI *any* is not; on the other hand, in the relevant construction in (ii), *any* is accepted. She then argues that the lack of intervention effect puts into question the analysis in terms of shielding.

(i)   John doesn't *always* call {someone/ *anyone} (Szabolcsi 2004: 415-416)

(ii)   I don't want to offend {someone / anyone}. (Goncharov 2018)

  b. Jumping is a planned voluntary act. (RESP) [*not > some]
  c. Jumping is due to an urge, or inability to resist a temptation. (non-RESP) [✓not > some]

(16) *Controlled infinitive complement*

  a. *Nem akarok   leugrani valahonnan.* (Hungarian)
     not   want.1SG jump.INF from.somewhere
     'I don't want to jump from somewhere.' (*idem.*6)

  b. Context: Look at those rocks. It would be fun to climb and jump. – I am not going. I don't want to jump from anywhere. (RESP) [*not > some]

  c. Context: there's a great view from those rocks. Let's go climb them. – I have the fear of heights. I don't want to jump from anywhere. (non-RESP) [✓not > some]

Szabolcsi's analysis is thus recapitulated by the configurations in (17)–(19): in all three types of complements (controlled infinitive, controlled subjunctive and non-controlled subjunctive), RESP and non-RESP cases yield structural differences: the non-RESP marker projects an extra layer serving to create an anti-licensing domain for PPIs.

(17) *Controlled infinitive complement*

  a. [DP1 ... not INF$^{\text{RESP}}$ ... PPI] [*not > some]
  b. [DP1 ... not [INF$^{\text{non-RESP}}$ PPI]] [✓not > some]

(18) *Controlled subjunctive complement*

  a. *[DP1 ... not pro SBJV$^{\text{RESP}}$ PPI] [obviation]
  b. [DP1 ... not [pro SBJV$^{\text{non-RESP}}$ PPI]] [✓not > some]

(19) *Non-controlled subjunctive complement*

  a. [DP1 ... not DP2 SBJV$^{\text{RESP}}$ PPI] [*not > some]
  b. [DP1 ... not [DP2 SBJV$^{\text{non-RESP}}$ PPI]] [✓not > some]

However, French PPIs like *quelqu'un* 'someone' in non-controlled subjunctive complements, as in (20a), and English PPIs like *someone* in non-controlled infinitive complements, as in (20b),[5] take narrow scope under

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[5]Given that it is possible to add the prepositional complementizer *for* before the infinitive subject, I assume that the latter is inside the complement and that this construction

the matrix negation, when the complements include the RESP-inducing
verb *kill*.

(20) a. *Non-controlled subjunctive complement*
          Eliott, je ne veux pas que tu tues quelqu'un ... Une nouvelle
          vie s'ouvre à toi ... ce serait bien qu'elle ne se déroule pas en
          prison ... (French)
          'Eliott, I don't want you to kill someone ... A new life is open
          to you ... it would be nice if your new life did not go on in
          prison ...' (M. Carrieu 1990. *Le Regarder en Face.*)
      b. *Non-controlled infinitive complement*
          Then why do you want to spare her? – I have many reasons.
          First, I don't want you to kill someone. Second, I'm opposed to
          murder in general. And third, I'm curious about that phantom
          girl. (`https://tinyurl.com/y9wmgmqp`)

Taking into account these data, it seems to be more appropriate to draw a
line between canonical-control cases on the one hand and non-canonical
control and non-control cases on the other hand, as shown in (21a-c).

(21) a. *Canonical controlled infinitive*
          [DP ... not INF$^{\text{RESP}}$ PPI] [*not > some]
      b. *Non-canonical controlled infinitive or subjunctive*
          [DP ... not [INF$^{\text{non-RESP}}$ PPI / pro SBJV$^{\text{non-RESP}}$ PPI]] [✓not >
          some]
      c. *Non-controlled infinitive or subjunctive*
          [DP1 ... not [(for) DP2 INF PPI / DP2 SBJV PPI]] [✓not > some]

In the next subsection, I review Zu (2018) who proposes a detailed analysis
in this direction, based on the conjunct vs. disjunct verbal markings in
Newari.

2.4 Canonical and non-canonical control: Zu (2018)

The conjunct vs. disjunct distinction in Newari shows similarities with and
differences from the infinitive vs. subjunctive distinction in Hungarian.
On the one hand, when matrix and complement subjects are coreferen-

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corresponds to a non-controlled subjunctive complement in French.

tial, and the complement is of canonical control type, including the RESP-inducing predicate *go there*, the conjunct suffix (corresponding to the infinitive) should be used, as in (22a), and the disjunct one (corresponding to the subjunctive) is excluded, as in (22b).

(22)   *Canonical controlled complement*
    a.   *wõ: wa   ana wan-ã   dhakā: dhāla.* (Newari)
        (s)he.ERG (s)he there go-PST.CONJ that   said
        '(S)he$_1$ said that (s)he$_1$ went.CONJ there.' (Zu 2018: 143)
    b.   **wõ: wa   ana wan-a   dhakā: dhāla.* (Newari)
        (s)he.ERG (s)he there go-PST.DISJ that   said
        *'(S)he$_1$ said that (s)he$_1$ went.DISJ there.' (*ibid.*)

On the other hand, in non-canonical control cases, as in (23) including the non-RESP inducing predicate *accidentally run into someone*, acceptability is reversed: the conjunct suffix is excluded, as in (23a), differently from a Hungarian infinitive form in (13b), and the disjunct suffix should be used, as in (23b). In other words, the conjunct vs. disjunct distinction in Newari more transparently reflects the distinction between canonical and non-canonical control than the infinitive vs. subjunctive distinction in Hungarian.

(23)   *Non-canonical controlled complement*
    a.   **Shyam-a   dhāla ki wõ: masika   shun*
        Shyam-ERG said   that he.ERG accidentally someone
        nãpalāt-ã
        meet-PST.CONJ
        *'Shyam$_1$ said that he$_1$ accidentally ran.CONJ into someone.'
        (*idem.*146)
    b.   *Shyam-a   dhāla ki wõ: masika   shun*
        Shyam-ERG said   that he.ERG accidentally someone
        nãpalāt-a
        meet-PST.DISJ
        'Shyam$_1$ said that he$_1$ accidentally ran.DISJ into someone.'
        (*ibid.*)

    Zu (2018) proposes the following analysis of this distribution. In the

left periphery of the complement clause is projected a Sentential Phrase (SenP) which conveys a perspective from which the complement clause is presented. The SenP forms a local domain and normally functions as a phase for syntactic operations. However, in canonical control, as in (24a), where the matrix subject (coreferential with the complement subject) bears a RESP relation with the complement situation, "the Sen head contains unchecked phi-features" (Zu 2018: 157), which "must be checked against a contextually salient individual" (*idem.*158), provided by the matrix subject. The domain is thus not closed off (that is, suspended), and the SenP does not form a local domain, as in (24a). But, "in non-canonical control [...] the Sen head enters the derivation with no phi-features" (*ibid.*). In the same vein, "the Sen head in non-control does not have uninterpretable features" (*idem.*159). The SenP therefore serves as a phase, as in (24b-c).

(24)   a.   *Canonical control* (Simplified from Zu (2018: 154))
            $[_{\text{CP1 (phase1)}}$ DP ... $[_{\text{SenP [uninterpretable phi-features]}}$ pro verb.CONJ]]
       b.   *Non-canonical control*
            $[_{\text{CP1(phase1)}}$ DP ... $[_{\text{SenP(phase2)}}$ pro verb.DISJ]]
       c.   *Non-control*
            $[_{\text{CP1(phase1)}}$ DP1 ... $[_{\text{SenP(phase2)}}$ DP2 verb.DISJ]]

According to Zu (2018), the different scope readings of PPIs in canonically and non-canonically controlled English infinitives in (25a-b) are also due to the presence or absence of uninterpretable phi features. The narrow scope reading of PPIs in non-controlled infinitives, as in (25c), may also be accounted for in the same way

(25)   a.   *Canonical control*
            $[_{\text{phase1}}$ I don't want PRO to call someone]. [*not > some]
            (*idem.*158)
       b.   *Non-canonical control*
            $[_{\text{phase1}}$ I don't want $[_{\text{phase2}}$ PRO to offend someone]]. [✓not > some] (*ibid.*)
       c.   *Non-control*
            $[_{\text{phase1}}$ I don't want $[_{\text{phase2}}$ (for) you to kill someone. [✓not > some]

The dichotomy *canonical control* vs. *non-canonical control* and *non-control* is further supported by the fact that an explicit occurrence of the infinitive subject is forced in non-control, as in (26a), and is not so bad in non-canonical control, as in (26b), but is totally unacceptable in canonical control, as in (26c).

(26)   a.   *Non-control*
              I want for you to come back in my life. (Zu 2018: 153)
        b.   *Non-canonical control*
              (?)I want for me to be in shape for tomorrow's game. (*ibid.*)
        c.   *Canonical control*
              *I want for me to call my mom. (*ibid.*)

Thus, Zu's analysis is essentially based on the different feature setting of the Sen head: it bears uninterpretable phi-features in canonical control, but not in non-canonical control and non-control. This hypothesis may be valid for Newari where the dichotomy is explicitly observed through the different verbal suffixes, but sounds ad hoc for English where morphological support is lacking. Furthermore, unlike Szabolcsi (2010), Zu (2018) does not invoke Neg-lowering in order to account for the narrow scope reading of PPIs in (25b). Therefore, the narrow scope of PPIs with respect to the matrix negation in (25b) and with respect to the clause-mate negation in (1a-b) are essentially independent phenomena, and the analysis of the former case cannot be applied to the latter in spite of the common non-RESP nature of the complement.

If we however assume, with Szabolcsi, that a non-RESP predicate serves to make infinitive complements equivalent to subjunctive complements, rather than to prevent domain suspension, the similar narrow scope reading of PPIs in the two different contexts may be analyzed in a parallel way. This possibility will be pursued in §3.

2.5 Recapitulation

In this section, I present (i) Richardson's analysis according to which negative imperatives including a non-RESP predicate, like in (27a), are paraphrased by means of the coerced monitoring predicate TAKE CARE, as in (27b), and (ii) Szabolcsi's analysis according to which non-RESP controlled infinitive complements, as in (28a), are equivalent to subjunctive ones. Sz-

abolcsi further suggests that the matrix negation is lowered into a position where it clause-externally scopes over the complement, as in (28b).

(27) a. Do not question somebody's immigration status. (= (1a))
　　　b. TAKE CARE not to question somebody's immigration status.

(28) a. I do not want that I offend someone.
　　　b. I want for it <u>not</u> to be the case [that I offend **someone**].

There remain some questions. As regards Richardson's analysis, the motivation of coercion is not clear, and it is not clear how PPIs are licensed in (27b). Concerning Szabolcsi's analysis, it is not clear when the matrix negation is interpreted in a lowered position, and why it is not interpreted inside the complement, as in ordinary Neg-lowering cases (e.g. "It is not likely that she will go" paraphrasable by "It is likely that she will not go."), but in an intermediate position, as in (28b).

3 Proposals

To answer these questions, I propose the following hypotheses.
(I) The matrix negation in (29a) may be implicitly lowered down into the complement when the volition predicate conveys an *effective preference*.
(II) The non-RESP nature of the complement predicate allows not only the controlled infinitive complement to be reanalyzed as a subjunctive one, but also the negation once lowered to be interpreted in a clause-external position, as in (29b). Furthermore, a monitoring predicate is coerced.
(III) In negative imperatives, as in (30a), the non-RESP nature of the predicate brings about the projection of the subjunctive complement, the clause-external interpretation of the negation, and the coercion of the monitoring predicate, all of which allow a PPI in the complement to be licensed by a clause-external negation, as in (30b). Essentially the same operations occur in negated controlled complements, as shown in (31a-b).

(29) a. I don't want to offend someone.
　　　b. I want$^{\text{effective preference}}$ to TAKE CARE for it <u>not</u> to be the case [that I offend **someone**].

(30) a. Do not question somebody's immigration status. (= (1a))
　　　b. TAKE CARE for it <u>not</u> to be the case [that you question **some-**

body's immigration status].

(31) a. I was trying not to be somebody's bitch for 10 years. (= (1b))
      b. I was trying to TAKE CARE for it <u>not</u> to be the case [that I be **somebody**'s bitch].

In what follows, after having introduced the background of Hypothesis (I), I present evidence in favor of each of the three hypotheses, based on Japanese data.

3.1 Background of Hypothesis (I)

Levinson (2003) observes that one and the same reasonable person can utter (32a) and (32b) to reply to the same question in (32), within a short time and without having changed her mind.

(32) Do you want to play tennis?
      a. I really want to play, but I have to teach.
      b. No [= I don't want to], I have to teach.

Levinson (2003: 222-223) claims that this is because *want* is ambiguous: it denotes a mere desire "as a matter of psychological fact" in (32a), but a "desire accompanying intentional action" in (32b). Condoravdi & Lauer (2012) call the second meaning "effective preferences". Grano (2018) proposes to paraphrase the two readings by *would like* and *intend*. I hereafter call the two readings *want*^would-like and *want*^intend. One test to disambiguate them is provided by *anankastic conditionals*, roughly defined by (33a) and illustrated by (33b).

(33) a. For an agent *a* and predicates *P* and *Q*,
          if *a* wants to *P*, *a* must *Q* = *a* must *Q* in order to *P*
          (*Q* is a necessary condition for *P*)
      b. If you want to go to Harlem, you must take the A train.
          = You must take the A train in order to go to the Harlem.
          (Condoravdi & Lauer 2016: 2)

Now, the compatibility of *want* with the anankastic conditional in (34a) indicates that it is interpreted here as *want*^intend. In the paraphrase in (34b), negation scopes over the infinitive clause, which suggests that it is

also interpreted in (34a) in a lowered position where it scopes over the infinitive complement.

(34)   a.   If you don't want to offend someone, you must watch your behavior well.
        b.   = You must watch your behavior well in order not to offend someone.

To further support the correlation between the *want*^intend reading and the availability of the lowered-Neg interpretation, I refer to Horn's (2001: 320) analysis in terms of *(in)tolerance*, informally represented by (35). For example, on the one hand, *likely* is intolerant, as shown by the incongruity of (36a). The disjunction in (36b) is exclusive. When the disjunction is shared between discourse participants, if the speaker asserts that the first disjunct is false, the disjunction being exclusive, the hearer can infer the truth of the second disjunct, where the negation is lowered.

(35)   For a predicate P and a proposition p, (i) when $P(p) \lor P(\neg p)$ is shared by discourse participants, and (ii) when P is intolerant [i.e. $*P(p) \land P(\neg p)$], if the speaker utters $\neg P(p)$, the hearer can infer $P(\neg p)$.

(36)   a.   #It's likely she'll go and likely she won't go. (Horn 2001: 320)
        b.   (It's likely she will go) $\lor$ (It's likely she won't go) [exclusive]

On the other hand, *possible* is tolerant, as shown by the acceptability of (37a). Therefore, in the inclusive disjunction in (37b), even if the speaker denies the truth of the first disjunct, the hearer cannot conclude the truth of the second disjunct. Now, intolerant *likely*, but not tolerant *possible*, yields a lowered-Neg reading, as in (38a-b).

(37)   a.   It's possible she'll go and possible she won't go.
        b.   (It's possible she will go) $\lor$ (It's possible she won't go) [inclusive]

(38)   a.   It's not likely she will go. $\fallingdotseq$ It's likely she will not go.
        b.   It's not possible she will go. $\neq$ It's possible she will not go.

Now, are the two readings of *want* intolerant or tolerant? Condoravdi &

Lauer (2016: 28) point out that *want* allows contradictory wishes only for *want*^would-like: "the consistency of [(39)] is dependent on a contextual resolution for *want* where the targeted preference is 'mere desire' [...]. While [(39) with *want*^would-like] is coherent (and simply attributes indecision to John), [(39) with *want*^intend] sounds contradictory (or attributes a certain amount of irrationality to John)".

(39)   [John said] I want to move in with my girlfriend, but I also want to keep living alone. (Condoravdi & Lauer 2016: 28)

In this example, the complement of the second conjunct, *to keep living alone*, amounts to the negation of the complement of the first conjunct, *to move in with my girlfriend*. (39) thus suggests that *want*^would-like is tolerant, while *want*^intend is intolerant. We have now confirmed, from a theoretical viewpoint, Hypothesis (I), according to which the matrix negation may be lowered when the volition predicate conveys an effective preference. In effect, with a non-RESP predicate denoting a situation to avoid for social or moral reasons, like *offend* in (3a), *not want to* tends to convey not a simple absence of desire (which sounds half-hearted in these contexts), but the expression of an intention to monitor against an occurrence of the relevant situation.

3.2 Evidence for Hypotheses (I) and (II)

Some Japanese data provide empirical support for Hypotheses (I) and (II). The Japanese volitional form *tai*, as in (40a), requires the coreference of the matrix and complement subjects. When the two subjects are disjoint, another form *tehosii* with a dative-marked subject, is used, as in (40b).

(40)   a.   *watasi-wa gaisyutusi-tai.* (Japanese)
               me-TOP   go.out-want
               'I want to go out.'
         b.   *watasi-wa anata-ni gaisyutusi-tehosii.*
               me-TOP   you-DAT go.out-want
               'I want (for) you to go out.'

Japanese also possesses a strong NPI *daremo* which is licensed by a clause-mate negation, as in (41a), but not by a clause-external negation, as in

(41b).

(41)   a.   *John-wa **daremo** kidutuke-<u>nai</u>.*
             John-TOP anyone hurt-NEG
             'John does <u>not</u> hurt **anyone**.'
    b.   **watasi-wa [John-ga **daremo** kidutukeru-to]-wa*
             me-TOP   John-NOM anyone hurt-COMP-*top*
             omowa-<u>nai</u>.
             think-NEG
             'I do<u>n't</u> think [that John hurts **anyone**].'

Now, when volitional *tai* is negated, the strong NPI *daremo* as well as the indefinite PPI *dareka*, as in (42a-b), can appear in the complement (in these examples and in the examples below, I only focus on the narrow scope reading of *dareka*). In both cases, an anankastic conditional reading is available, as shown in (43), which indicates that volitional *tai* conveys here an effective preference, and that the matrix negation may therefore a priori be interpreted in a lowered position.

(42)   a.   *daremo kizutuke-taku-nai.*
             anyone hurt-want-NEG
             'I do not want to hurt anyone.'
             (`https://tinyurl.com/ybdawhod`)
    b.   *dareka-o   kizutuke-taku-nai.*
             someone-ACC hurt-want-NEG
             'I do not want to hurt someone.'
             (`https://tinyurl.com/ybukoyjf`)

(43)   *{daremo/dareka-o}   kizutuke-taku-nai-nara kotoba-ni*
        {anyone/someone-ACC} hurt-want-NEG-COND   mouth-DAT
        tyuuisiro.
        watch.IMP
        'If you don't want to hurt anyone/someone, watch your mouth.' = You must watch your mouth in order not to hurt anyone/someone.[6]

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[6]In fact, the wide scope reading of *dareka* over the negation is preferred here. The narrow scope reading is forced by adding another noun phrase after the indefinite, as in *dareka midikana hito* 'someone nearby'.

But the position where the negation is interpreted turns out to be different in *daremo* cases and in *dareka* cases. As in (44a) and (44b), in the complement of negated *tai*, *daremo* cannot follow the adverb *ukkari* 'inadvertently' which highlights the non-RESP nature of the complement, but can precede it. The same is true in simple clauses, as in (45a) and (45b).

(44)   a. ??*ukkari   daremo kizutuke-taku-nai.*
             inadvertently anyone hurt-want-NEG
             'I don't want to inadvertently hurt anyone.'
         b. *daremo ukkari   kizutuke-taku-nai.*
             anyone inadvertently hurt-want-NEG
             'I don't want to hurt anyone inadvertently.'

(45)   a. ??*ukkari   daremo kizutuke-nai.*
             inadvertently anyone hurt-NEG
             ??'Inadvertently, I hurt no one.'
         b. *daremo ukkari   kizutuke-nai.*
             anyone inadvertently hurt-NEG
             'No one, I inadvertently hurt.'

I propose to attribute the unacceptability of (45a) to the semantic incongruity of the wide scope reading of the non-RESP-inducing adverb over the negation, as shown by that of the English translation. (45b) is acceptable since the scrambling of *daremo* allows the negation to out-scope the adverb, just as in the English translation including topicalized *no one*. Now, combining Hypothesis (I) advocating a lowered-Neg interpretation with Szabolcsi's idea according to which the non-RESP nature of the predicate allows a subjunctive complement, we can account for the acceptability contrast between (44a) and (44b) by paraphrasing them as in (46a) and (46b), where the matrix negation is interpreted inside the complement, and takes narrow or wide scope with respect to the RESP-inducing adverb (as regards the coercion of the causative predicate BRING IT ABOUT, see the discussion in §4.1).

(46)   a. ??I want to BRING IT ABOUT that I inadvertently not hurt anyone.
         b.   I want to BRING IT ABOUT that no one I inadvertently hurt.

Next, (47a) shows that, contrary to *daremo*, *dareka* can follow the adverb

ukkari.[7] Hypothesis (II), which advocates a clause-external interpretation of the negation, allows us to paraphrase (47a) by (47b) and to account for the different acceptability of (44a), with the strong NPI *daremo*, and (47a), with the PPI *dareka*.

(47) a. *ukkari   dareka-o   kizutuke-taku-nai.*
         inadvertently someone-ACC hurt-want-NEG
         'I don't want to inadvertently hurt someone.'
      b. I want to TAKE CARE for it <u>not</u> to be the case [that I inadvertently hurt **someone**].

The different positioning of the lowered negation in *daremo* cases and in *dareka* cases is further confirmed by their different compatibility with another strong NPI, *kessite* 'at all', which requires to be licensed by a clause-mate negation, as in (48a).

(48) a. *kessite {daremo/??dareka-o}   kizutuke-taku-nai.*
         at all   {anyone/someone-ACC} hurt-want-NEG
         'I don't want to hurt {anyone/someone} at all.'
         (Adapted from https://tinyurl.com/yb229p6y)
      b. *kessite {daremo/??dareka-o}   kizutuke-nai.*
         at all   {anyone/someone-ACC} hurt-NEG
         'I never hurt {anyone / someone}] at all.'

Under the proposed hypothesis, *daremo* in (48a) is acceptable since the negation lowered into the complement can also license the strong NPI *kessisite*, just as in (48b) where the two strong NPIs are in the same clause as the negation; *dareka* is unacceptable here since it requires a clause-external negation while *kesssite* requires a clause-mate negation.

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[7]Its compatibility with the non-RESP-inducing auxiliary, *tesimau* 'happen to', also distinguishes *dareka* from *daremo*, as in (i), which indicates that the negation is interpreted in a higher position in *dareka* cases than in *daremo* cases.

(i)   *{??daremo/dareka-o}   kizutuke-tesimai-taku-nai.*
       {anyone/someone-ACC} hurt-happen.to-want-NEG
       ??'I want to happen to hurt no one / I want not to happen to hurt someone.'

3.3 Evidence for Hypothesis (III)

The 'inadvertently' (*ukkari*) test also supports Hypothesis (III). In the negated complement in (49a) and the negative imperative in (50a), this adverb can precede the PPI *nanika* 'something', but not the strong NPI *nanimo* 'anything'.

(49)   a.   *ukkari*   *{??nanimo/nanika-o}*   *kowasa-nai*
            Inadvertently {anything/something-ACC} break-NEG
            yoonisi-ta.
            try-PST
            ??'I tried to inadvertently break nothing / I tried not to inadvertently break something.'

      b.   I tried to TAKE CARE for it <u>not</u> to be the case [that I inadvertently break **something**]

(50)   a.   *ukkari*   *{??nanimo/nanika-o}*   *kowasu-na.*
            inadvertently {anything/something-ACC} break-IMP.NEG.
            ??'Inadvertently break nothing! / Don't inadvertently break something!'

      b.   TAKE CARE for it <u>not</u> to be the case [that you inadvertently break **something**].

Hypothesis (III) accounts for these contrasts as follows. On the one hand, in (49a) and (50a), *nanimo* is unacceptable since the negation is lowered into the subjunctive complement (projected due to the non-RESP nature of the predicate), and remains there to license the strong NPI. But when this NPI follows the adverb *ukkari*, the negation is out-scoped by the adverb, which yields a semantic incongruity. On the other hand, *dareka* is acceptable since the negation may be interpreted in a clause-external position in order to avoid an incongruous scope relation, just as in the paraphrases in (49b) and (50b).

Thus, we can now answer two of the three remaining questions: (i) when is the matrix negation lowered into the complement of a volitional predicate?; (ii) why is the negation interpreted clause-externally when the predicate is of non-RESP nature? But we still don't have an answer to the third question, that is, the motivation for coercion of the monitoring predicate. I will try to tackle this problem by examining previous approaches to im-

peratives and obligatory control.

4 Previous analyses of imperatives and obligatory control

This section reviews two main approaches to the semantics of imperatives and obligatory control, that is, the property-denoting approach (§4.1) and the proposition-denoting one (§4.2). Meanwhile, I also discuss how each approach deals with cases where the addressee or the attitude holder doesn't bear a RESP relation with the denoted situation, for example, third person imperatives, as in (51a), where "the person or persons who are supposed to carry out the action the imperative specifies are not [. . .] those to whom it is addressed" (Hamblin 1987: 53), and uncontrolled complements, as in (51b), where the matrix and complement subjects are distinct.

(51)   a.   Your guards be the diversion while we sneak in!
              (Potsdam 1998: 208)
        b.   John intended for Bill to leave. (Grano 2015: 242)

4.1 The property-denoting approach

According to Portner (2005; 2007; 2012), three major sentence types (declaratives, interrogatives and imperatives) correspond to different semantic types (proposition, set of propositions and property) and are related to different forces (Assertion, Asking and Requiring) and to different discourse components (Common Ground, Question Set and To-Do List). Declaratives denote a proposition, and serve to make an Assertion which boils down to adding a proposition into the Common Ground; interrogatives denote a set of propositions, and serve to make an Asking which amounts to add a set of propositions into the Question Set; imperatives denote a property, and serve to make a Requiring which boils down to adding a property to the To-Do List (set of properties), abbreviated by TDL below. Thus, an imperative sentence expresses a property, "which can only be true of the addressee" (Portner 2007: 358), as in (52).

(52) $[\![Sit\ down!]\!] = [\lambda x.\ x\ \text{sits down}] \in \text{TDL(you)}$
        (Adapted from Portner 2007: 358)

Assuming, with Chierchia (1988), "that controlled complements denote properties", Grano (2015: 244) directly applies Portner's analysis of imper-

atives to the semantics of *intend*, which consists, as in (53a), in putting a property denoted by the complement into the matrix subject's Private TDL. Thus, (53b) means that the matrix subject, John, adds a property of leaving to his Private TDL.

(53)   a. $\llbracket intend \rrbracket = \lambda P_{\langle e,t \rangle} \lambda x.P \in$ Private TDL(x) (Grano 2015: 244)
       b. $\llbracket John\ intends\ to\ leave \rrbracket = [\lambda x.\ x\ leave] \in$ Private TDL(j) (*ibid.*)

As regards non-controlled complements, Jackendoff & Culicover (2003) propose, for (54a) including another obligatory control verb *plan*, an analysis in terms of coercion of the silent causative predicate BRING IT ABOUT THAT, as in (54b).

(54)   a.   Hilary plans for there to be more light in here.
            (Jackendoff & Culicover 2003: 542)
       b.   Hilary plans to BRING IT ABOUT THAT there is more light here.
            (*ibid.*)

(55)   a. $\llbracket$CAUSE$\rrbracket = \lambda p\ \lambda x.\ x$ brings it about that *p*. (Grano 2015: 246)
       b. $\llbracket John\ intends\ for\ Bill\ to\ leave \rrbracket$ (*ibid.*)
            $= [\lambda x.\ x$ BRINGS IT ABOUT THAT Bill leave] $\in$ Private TDL(j)

Formalizing the semantics of the causative predicate, as in (55a), Grano (2015) also proposes the analysis in terms of coercion, as in (55b) and further clarifies its motivation: a controlled complement denotes a property, while a non-controlled complement containing an explicit subject denotes a proposition. Coercion is required to repair type-mismatch.

Zanuttini et al. (2012: 1266, fn. 46) analyze essentially in the same way third person imperatives in Bhojpuri, as in (56).

(56)   *kha :y* (Bhojpuri)
       eat-IMP.3SG
       'Let him eat.' (Zanuttini et al. 2012: 1252)

(57)   a. $[\lambda x:\ x=$addressee(c).$[\lambda w.$ he eats in w]] (*idem.*1266, fn. 46)
       b. $\llbracket kha\ :y \rrbracket = [\lambda x.\ x$ BRINGS ABOUT IT THAT he eats] $\in$ TDL(you)

These authors then represent the semantics of (56) by (57a), suggesting that "intuitively, this places a requirement on the addressee that is only

satisfied if the referent of *he* eats." But (57a) is at odds with TDL canonical meaning since the role of the argument of the property is not specified. Here, following Hamblin's (1987) remarks according to which "the imperative: ⟨X do so-and-so⟩, addressed to *Y*, is really an elliptical plain-predicate imperative, ⟨Bring it about that X does so-and-so⟩", and inspired by Grano's (2015) analysis on uncontrolled infinitives, I propose that a causative predicate, BRING IT ABOUT is coerced to specify the relation between the hearer and the denoted proposition, as in (57b).[8]

Next, as regards the negative imperative in (58a) and the negated controlled complement in (58a), because of a non-RESP nature of the predicates, they are semantically interpreted as equivalent respectively to a third person subjunctive imperative and an uncontrolled subjunctive complement, both of which denote a proposition. To allow them to be appropriately put into the hearer's or the matrix subject's TDL and further repair type-mismatch, I propose, inspired by Richardson's (1985) analysis of negative imperatives, to introduce a monitoring predicate TAKE CARE, rather than a causative predicate BRING IT ABOUT (which is associated with a RESP situation, as argued by Farkas 1988), as in (58b-c) and (59b-c).

(58) a. Do not question somebody's immigration status. (= (1a))
      b. TAKE CARE for it <u>not</u> to be the case [that you question **somebody**'s immigration status].
      c. [λx. x TAKE CARE ¬∃p [p = λw (∃y. you question y's immigration status in w)]] ∈ TDL(you)

(59) a. I was trying not to be somebody's bitch for 10 years. (= (1b))
      b. I was trying to take care for it <u>not</u> to be the case [that I am **somebody's bitch**].
      c. [λx. x TAKE CARE ¬∃p [p = λw (∃y. I am y's bitch in w)]] ∈ Private TDL(I)

Thus, the property-denoting approach allows us to clarify the motivation for coercion of the monitoring predicate.

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[8]I owe the account of this part to Laurent Roussarie's insightful remarks (p.c.).

4.2 The proposition-denoting approach

Next, I review the proposition-denoting approach to imperatives and controlled infinitives. As regards imperatives, Kaufmann (2012) analyzes them as denoting a modalized proposition expressing a necessity. For example, the imperative in (60a) boils down to a modalized proposition, very roughly represented by (60b).

(60) a. Get up! (Kaufmann 2012: 131)
      b. $\forall w \in$ Modal Background. you get up in w
      c. [λw. you get up in w] $\in$ the speaker's effective preferences

From a slightly different perspective, Condoravdi & Lauer (2012: 48) claim that imperatives convey that the relevant proposition is among the speaker's effective preferences, as roughly represented in (60c). The negative imperative in (61a) paraphrased by (61b) may be analyzed as involving coercion of the monitoring predicate, as in (62a) (Kaufmann's approach) or as in (62b) (Condoravdi & Lauer's approach). But the motivation of coercion is not clear under their framework.

(61) a. Do not question somebody's immigration status. (= (1a))
      b. TAKE CARE for it not to be the case that you question somebody's immigration status.

(62) a. $\forall$w. you TAKE CARE in w $\neg\exists$p[p = λw′($\exists$y. you question y's immigration status in w′)]
      b. [λw. you TAKE CARE in w $\neg\exists$p [p = λw′($\exists$y. you question y's immigration status in w′)]] $\in$ the speaker's effective preferences

As regards controlled infinitives, while Grano (2015) invokes Portner's property-denoting approach of imperatives, Grano (2018) refers to Condoravdi & Lauer's proposition-denoting theory. According to Grano (2018), (63a) means that John's leaving is among his effective preferences, as in (63b).

(63) a. John intends to leave.
      b. [λw. John leaves in w] $\in$ John's effective preferences.

Grano (2018) further proposes a detailed analysis of non-controlled infini-

tives. This author first advocates a parallelism between *intend* and its adverbial form *intentionally*, which necessarily induces a RESP relation. He then claims that a RESP relation is not occasionally coerced, as proposed by Grano (2015), but inherently included in the semantics of *intend*. Thus, according to Grano (2018: 616), "intention reports that instantiate syntactic control, like [64a], have essentially the same status as intention reports that do not instantiate syntactic control, like [65a]. [...] In both cases, John names [...] the individual who bears the RESP-relation with *p* [= the complement proposition]. The only difference is that in [64a], in virtue of being a control sentence, John also names the participant associated with the subject of *break the window*, whereas in [65a], Bill takes this place."

(64)   a.   John intended to break the window. (Grano 2018: 616)
       b.   John intended to BRING IT ABOUT THAT he break the window.

(65)   a.   John intended for Bill to break the window. (*ibid.*)
       b.   John intended to BRING IT ABOUT THAT Bill break the window.

From this perspective, Grano (2018) paraphrases (64a) and (65a) in a parallel way by (64b) and (65b) and calls this approach "COERCION FREE semantics for intention reports". As a counterexample to Grano's (2015) approach, Grano (2018: 624) cites (66), which includes the non-RESP predicate *resemble his father*.

(66)   a.   John intended to resemble his father.
       b.   John intended to BRING IT ABOUT THAT he resemble his father.

   In order to naturally interpret (66a), the causative predicate is needed to establish a RESP relation between John and his resemblance to his father. But if the controlled complement in (66a) denotes a property, no type-mismatch should take place, and we find no motivation to coerce the causative predicate. On the contrary, the semantics of (66b) is naturally obtained by the coercion-free approach according to which the verb *intend* always introduces the causative predicate by its lexical characteristics. However, if we assume, with Szabolcsi (2010), that the non-RESP nature of the complement hinders obviation, and reanalyzes a controlled infinitive as a subjunctive complement denoting a proposition, the coercion-based approach naturally makes sense of the semantics in (66b), and (66a)

no longer contradicts this approach.

Furthermore, if we apply the coercion-free approach to imperatives, the semantics of the order in (67a) boils down to (67b) including the co-erced predicate, just as the Italian third person imperative (68a) involving a subjunctive verbal form, represented by (68b).

(67)   a.   Get up! (= (65a))
            b.   [λw. you BRING IT ABOUT THAT you get up in w] ∈ the speaker's effective preferences

(68)   a.   *Che venda   anche lui!* (Italian)
                that come.SBJV also   he
                'See to it that he comes as well.' (Zanuttini et al. 2012: 1251)
            b.   [λw. you BRING IT ABOUT THAT he come in w] ∈ the speaker's effective preferences

But such a parallel treatment obscures the marked status of third person imperatives.[9] In sum, the proposition-denoting approach to imperatives and to controlled infinitives is forced either (i) to invoke, without clarifying its motivation, coercion of a causative or monitoring predicates or (ii) to overgeneralize the use of these predicates.[10]

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[9]Kaufmann (2012) effectively puts into question Potsdam's (1998) view according to which the referent of the imperative subject "is not restricted to [. . .] the addressee", and suggests to analyze examples like (68a) as subjunctive clauses, concluding that "impera-tive subjects are restricted to refer to [. . .] the addressee(s)" (Kaufmann 2012: 122).

[10]von Fintel & Iatridou (2017) give two arguments against the proposition-denoting approach to imperatives; (i) indifferent reading, as in (ia); (ii) "non-endorsing *Imperative and Declarative* construction", as in (ib).

(i)   a.   Go left! Go right! I don't care. (von Fintel & Iatridou 2017: 291)
         b.   Ignore your homework and you will fail this class. (*idem.* 297)

(ii)   a.   #You should go left! You should go right! I don't care. (Adapted from *idem.* 294)
         b.   #You should ignore your homework and you will fail this class.

According to Kaufmann, imperatives are inherently disposed with performatively inter-preted *should*. First, (ia) would then be paraphrased by (iia), which is not the case: the first and the second sentences of (iia) are contradictory. Next, a non-endorsing *Impera-tive and Declarative* construction, like (ib), aims at warning the addressee NOT to per-form the action expressed by the imperative (e.g. NOT to ignore the homework in (ia)).

5 Concluding remarks

This study tries to account for a seemingly peculiar narrow scope reading of PPI indefinites under a clause-mate negation in negative imperatives, as in (69a), and in negated controlled infinitives, as in (69b).

(69)   a.   Do <u>not</u> question **somebody**'s immigration status. (= (1a))
        b.   I was trying <u>not</u> to be **somebody**'s bitch for 10 years. (= (1b))

Observing that the predicate in these examples denotes a non-RESP situation, I referred to (i) Richardson (1985), who claims that the interpretation of negative imperatives involves coercion of the monitoring predicate TAKE CARE, and (ii) Szabolcsi (2010), who argues that the non-RESP nature of the predicate amounts to projecting a subjunctive clause. Applying these two analyses to the examples in (69a-b), I further claimed that negation may be interpreted in a clause-external position to avoid an incongruous scope relation with respect to the non-RESP complement.[11] The projection of a subjunctive clause, the clause-external interpretation

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The paraphrase by (iib) is therefore inappropriate.

According to Condoravdi & Lauer (2012), the speaker's preference meaning is built in the semantics of imperatives. Therefore a paraphrase by *I want to . . .* should always be possible. This analysis, however, does not hold for (ia) and (ib), as shown in (iiia-b).

(iii)   a.   #I want you to go left. I want you to go right. I don't care. (*idem.*)
         b.   #I want you to ignore your homework and you will fail this class.

[11]The distribution of Dutch PPI predicates, like *in een lasting parket* 'in a difficult / awkward situation' seems at odds with the proposed analysis. These predicates are anti-licensed by an external negation, as in (i). But they are licensed in the complement of negated *willen* 'want', as in (ii).

(i)   **Ik denke niet dat   we in een lasting parket zitten.*
         I   think not that we in a   tough spot   sit.
         'I don't think that we are in a difficult situation.' (Hoeksema 2018)

(ii)   *Ik wil   u   niet in een lasting parket brengen.*
         I   want you   not in a   tough spot   bring.
         'I don't want to put you in an awkward position.' (*ibid.*)

A possibility is that the narrow scope reading is due to a contrast between *you* and someone else. A detailed examination of these data is a subject of future research.

of negation and the coercion of the monitoring predicate amount to paraphrasing (69a-b) by (70a-b), which allows us to account for the licensing of PPI indefinites.

(70)   a.   TAKE CARE for it <u>not</u> to be the case [that you question **somebody**'s immigration status].
         b.   I was trying to TAKE CARE for it <u>not</u> to be the case [that I be **somebody**'s bitch].

I further showed that the property-denoting approach to imperatives and controlled infinitive complements accounts for the motivation of coercion in terms of type-mismatch, while the proposition-denoting approach either cannot account for the motivation of coercion or leads to overgeneralization of causative or monitoring predicates.

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