On non-modal evidentials Lisa Matthewson

Recent research has established substantive empirical differences between a class of evidentials which *are* epistemic modals, and a class which are *not* (Izvorski 1997, Faller 2002, 2006, McCready and Ogata 2007, Matthewson et al. 2007, Waldie et al. 2009, Peterson 2009, a.o.). Observe, for example, that the Cuzco Quechua non-modal reportative -si is felicitous when the speaker knows that the embedded proposition is false (1), while the St'át'imcets (Lillooet Salish) modal reportative ku7 is infelicitous in the same environment (2). The St'át'imcets reportative does, and the Quechua reportative does not, pattern like an epistemic modal, as shown in (3).

(1)Pay-kuna-s ñoqa-man-qa muntu-ntin-pi saqiy-wa-n, qulqi-ta (s)-he-PL-REPORT I-ILLA-TOP money-ACC lot-INCL-LOC leave-10-3 mana-má riki riku-sqa-yui ni un sol-ta centavo-ta-pis right see-PP-2 sol-ACC not-SURP not one cent-ACC-ADD saqi-sha-wa-n-chu leave-prog-10-3-NEG

'They [reportedly] left me a lot of money, but, as you have seen, they didn't leave me one *sol*, not one cent.' (Faller 2002:191)

- (2) # um'-en-tsal-itás ku7 án'was-a xetspqíqen'kst táola, i give-DIR-1SG.OBJ-3PL.ERG **REPORT** DET.PL hundred dollar two-EXIS t'u7s-7um'-en-tsál-itas aozkw ku stam' but NOM-give-DIR-1S.OBJ-3PL.ERG DET what NEG DET 'They [reportedly] gave me \$200, but they didn't give me anything.' (Matthewson et al. 2007)
- (3) # They *might/must* have given me \$200, but they didn't give me anything.'

For the class of non-modal evidentials, there are several theoretical approaches currently on the market, including:

- i. Speech-act/illocutionary operators (Faller 2002, C. Davis et al. 2007)
- ii. Sentential-force specifiers (Portner 2006)
- iii. Contributors of not-at-issue assertions (Murray 2009a,b)

The differences between these analyses reflect part of an important larger debate about what types of not-at-issue meaning exist in natural language (cf. Roberts et al. 2009), and about the nature of assertion itself. The question addressed in this talk is how we can determine which is the best framework to adopt for non-modal evidentials, and in particular whether the different approaches correspond to substantive empirical differences (as we saw with the modal/non-modal split). I approach the bigger question by means of a case study of one non-modal evidential in St'át'imcets: *lákw7a*. I argue for the following proposals:

- i. *Lákw7a* is an evidential: it encodes information about evidence source.
- ii. *Lákw7a* is not a modal.

- *Lákw7a* is not a spatio-temporal operator in the sense of Faller (2004) or Chung (2005, 2007). However, the evidence source for *lákw7a* can only be correctly characterized if we adopt Faller's (2004) notion of (non-)overlap between the event and the speaker's perceptual field.
- iv. The effect of *lákw7a* on illocutionary force can equally well be analyzed using the approaches of Faller (2002), Portner (2006) or Murray (2009a,b).
- v. C. Davis et al.'s (2007) quality-threshold-based approach would also work, but would involve superfluous machinery.

I conclude that at this time there is no reason to believe that the competing theoretical approaches to non-modal evidentials reflect substantive empirical differences. Thus, while the choice between modal and non-modal analyses has an empirical basis, the choice between different approaches to non-modal evidentials rests solely on conceptual arguments. I conclude with some suggestions for the direction of future research on not-at-issue meanings.