



to features (but perhaps not unlimited recursion), such that Q might have 2 GENDER features, each embedded under a different ‘super-label’. The INDEX-CONCORD distinction thus illustrates the need for a more thorough discussion of the formal properties of features in Minimalism; the same issues might also be involved in explicitly formalizing notions such as feature strength.

A second difficulty involves the interpretability of INDEX features. If Q values its INDEX features via Agree with its complement, the framework of Chomsky (2001) would predict the Q’s INDEX features to be uninterpretable; furthermore, these features should not be available for further Agree with T, and as a consequence this would predict that N-agr should not be possible even with the INDEX-CONCORD distinction. These problems can be overcome by adopting the formulation of agreement proposed by Pesetsky and Torrego (2007), which would allow the INDEX features on Q to be valued via Agree with its complement, while still being interpretable and available as goals for further Agree.

Finally, we also note that some QNPs give rise to *partial* agreement (usually in free alternation with full agreement): in such cases, QNPs where the quantifier’s complement is a 1st/2nd person pronoun/pronominal clitic trigger NUMBER & GENDER agreement, but no PERSON agreement:

- (2) xelk-exen / xelek mi-ken hayu xaxamot.  
 part(MS.SG)-2FM.PL / part(MS.SG) of-you.FM.PL were.3PL smart.FM.PL  
 ‘Some of you (feminine) were smart.’ (Modern Hebrew)

As the QNP in (2) cannot get a 3rd person feature from the Q’s complement, we conclude that either the INDEX agreement between Q and its complement, or the agreement between the QNP and the copula, is partial (where 3rd person is default ‘agreement’). QNPs thus contribute to the body of evidence against the view in Chomsky (2001) that agreement is an ‘all or nothing’ operation that necessarily applies to all  $\phi$ -features as a bundle.

Given the central role of locality in current Minimalist syntax and the emphasis in this framework on the relationship between case and agreement, we conclude that the QNP agreement facts support adopting into this framework the distinction between INDEX and CONCORD features. This, in turn, provides an interesting test case for 3 foundational questions of Minimalist feature theory: how complex can features be, how is feature interpretability determined, and under what conditions can features act as goals for agreement.

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